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Bailey: Zoning--Modification of Zoning Ordinance Use Restrictions

ZONING-MODIFICATION OF ZONING
ORDINANCE USE RESTRICTIONS
As the population of this country increases, as new areas are
developed, and as older communities and parts of communities
change in character, the law of zoning will play an increasingly
important role in the life of every citizen. As zoning law becomes
more important, certain aspects of its application will become increasingly controversial.
One area of zoning law which in the past has been surrounded
by controversy and by a great deal of confusion is the "use variance," whereby a board of zoning appeals' permits a landowner to
use a parcel of land in a certain use district in a manner prohibited
by the zoning ordinance. In two recent decisions, Hardingv. Board
of Zoning Appeals2 and Wolfe v. Forbes,3 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did a great deal to lessen this confusion.
In Harding,the court recognized the valid distinction between
a conditional use and a variance, expressly overruling as to this
issue Miernyk v. Board of Zoning Appeals4 in which the distinction
had been erroneously obliterated.5 A conditional use, special exception, or special exception permit' is a permit granted by the
I The West Virginia statutes concerning the organization and powers of the
board of zoning appeals are W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24-51 to -58 (1969). These
statutes (and most of article 24 of chapter 8) are modeled after the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act prepared under the auspices of the United States Department
of Commerce. Acts patterned after the Enabling Act have been adopted in many
of the states. See 8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.49 (3d ed. 1965).
In some states the board of appeals is called a board of adjustment.
2 219 S.E.2d 324 (W. Va. 1975).
217 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1975).
'155 W. Va. 143, 181 S.E.2d 681 (1971).
219 S.E.2d at 327.
"In A.H. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 54-1 (3rd ed. 1972),
Chapter 54 is entitled 'Conditional Uses or Special Exception Permits;' footnote one
of this chapter explains why it is so entitled:
'Although in this chapter we adhere to ordinary terminology and use the
term "special exception use" or "special exception permit," it should be
pointed out in the beginning that this term is a misnomer. As will be
made clear in this chapter, no "exception" is made to the provisions of
the ordinance in permitting such use; the permit granted is for a use
specifically provided for in the ordinance in the case in which conditions,
legislatively prescribed are also found. A much more accurate description
would be "conditional use" permit.'"
Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 219 S.E.2d 324, 327 (W. Va. 1975).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976

1

STUDENT NOTES
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 7
board of zoning appeals enabling a landowner to use his land in a
manner specifically enumerated in the zoning ordinance.
In explaining the distinction, Chief Justice Haden, speaking
for the court, quoted at length from Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning
and Planning,7 wherein Rathkopf restates the following "excellent
language" ' from Syosset Holding Corp. v. Schlimm:9
There is a substantial difference between the two. The granting
of a special exception is apparently not too generally understood. It does not entail making an exception to the ordinance
but rather permitting certain uses which the ordinance authorizes under stated conditions. In short, a special exception is
one allowable when the facts and conditions specified in the
ordinance as those upon which the exception is permitted are
found to exist.
A special exception, unlike a variance, does not involve the
varying of the ordinance, but rather compliance with it.'0
Justice Haden also quoted Rathkopf's quotation from Tullo v.
Millburn Township:"
The term ('special exception') might well be said to be a misnomer. 'Special use' or 'special use permits' would be more accurate. The theory is that certain uses, considered by the local
legislative body to be essential or desirable for the welfare of the
community and its citizenry or substantial segments of it, are
entirely appropriate and not essentially incompatible with the
basic uses in any zone (or in certain particular zones), but not
at every or any location therein or without restrictions or conditions being imposed by reason of special problems the use or its
particular location in relation to neighboring properties presents from a zoning standpoint, such as traffic congestion,
safety, health, noise, and the like. The enabling act therefore
permits the local ordinance to require approval of the local
administrative agency as to the location of such use within the
zone. If the board finds compliance with the standards or requisites set forth in the ordinance, the right to the exception exists,
subject to such specific safeguarding conditions as the agency
A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING

(3d ed. 1972). [herein-

after cited as RUTHKOPFI.
I Both the Chief Justice and Rathkopf refer to the quote as "excellent language."
1 15 Misc. 2d 10, 11, 159 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (1956).
102 RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 54-6; Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 219
S.E.2d 324, 327-28 (W. Va. 1975).
1 54 N.J. Super 483, 490, 149 A.2d 620, 624-625 (App. Div. 1959).
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may impose by reason of the nature, location and incidents of
the particular use . . . . The point is that such special uses are
permissive in the particular zone under the ordinance and neither non-conforming or akin to a variance. The latter must be
especially clearly distinguished.2
The West Virginia Code section granting the board of zoning
appeals its authority reflects the distinction between a conditional
use and a variance, stating that:
The board of zoning appeals shall:
(3) Hear and decide specialexceptions to the terms of the
ordinance upon which the board is required to act under the
ordinance; and
(4) Authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance
from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the
public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall
be observed
and substantial justice done. [Emphasis sup23
plied].
The major controversy arises when a land'owner desires to use
his land in a manner prohibited by the zoning ordinance and not
enumerated as a use for which a special exception may be obtained. In Wolfe v. Forbes," the court held that a board of zoning
appeals may not by variance amend a zoning ordinance by permitting a use expressly prohibited thereby. Rathkopf states that "the
extent to which a board of appeals can, in the case of unnecessary
hardship or practical difficulty, vary the use provisions of the ordinance and permit uses prohibited in a specific district in which
property lies is the subject of divergent views in the courts."'
Some courts have held that the purpose of a variance is to
allow a board to correct minor deficiencies caused by the operation
of the ordinance by varying provisions relating to size, density,
122 RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 54-6; Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 219
S.E.2d 324, 328 (W. Va. 1975). For additional discussion see 2 RATHKOPF, supra note
7, ch. 54; E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAMCE- § 15-4 (3d ed. 1965); and 8 E.
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.160 (3d ed. 1965).
'3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24-55 (1969); Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals,

219 S.E.2d 324, 328 (W. Va. 1975).
" 217 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1975).
2 RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 38-1.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976

3

STUDENT NOTES

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 7
setback, and other requirements of this nature,'" reasoning that to
allow the board of zoning appeals to amend the use provisions of
the ordinance by varying its application to a particular parcel
would be to allow the board to exercise a legislative function reserved for the governing body of the municipality, thereby constituting an invalid and unconstitutional delegation of powers.' 7 In
considering this question, one court summarized:
While it is true that no body in which is vested the legislative
power may abdicate its legislative function by delegating power
to another body to make the law, it is equally well established
that the legislative body may delegate to a subordinate body the
power to execute and administer its laws, where the legislative
body has formulated a standard reasonably clear to govern the
action of such subordinate body. While these general rules are
well settled, their applicability probably never will be. The
ever-recurring problem is whether any statute constitutes an
unlawful delegation of legislative power or merely a power to
administer and execute the declared policy of the legislative
body within reasonably clear standards fixed by the statute.',
Those states which subscribe to the view that the power to grant
a use variance would be an unconstitutional delegation include
Kentucky,' 9 North Carolina,2" North Dakota,2' Texas,22 Utah,,
Louisiana, 4 Missouri,2 Wisconsin,2 and South Dakota." On the
other hand, a larger number of states have taken the view that a
"

Id.

Id.; See Nelson v. Donaldson, 255 Ala. 76, 50 So. 2d 244 (1951) and cases
collected therein.
' Nelson v. Donaldson, 255 Ala. 76, 81, 50 So. 2d 244, 248 (1951).
" Arrow Transportation Co. v. Planning and Zoning Comm., 299 S.W.2d 95
(Ky. 1956); Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162, 166 S.W.2d 290 (1942).
20 Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969); Application of O'Neal, 243 N.C. 714, 92 S.E.2d 189 (1956); James v. Sutton, 229 N.C. 515,
50 S.E.2d 300 (1948); Lee v. Bd. of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128 (1946).
21 Livingston v. Peterson, 59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816. (1930).
22 Board of Adjustment v. Willie, 511 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Swain
v. Board of Adjustment, 433 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Board of Adjustment v. Rich, 328 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
21 Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939).
24 City of New Orleans v. Leeco, 219 La. 550, 53 So. 2d 490 (1951).
2 State ex rel. Meyer v. Kinealy, 402 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1966); State ex reL. Nigro
v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 95, 27 S.W.2d 1030 (1930).
28 State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, 209 Wis. 63, 243 N.W. 317 (1932).
27 Graves v. Johnson, 75 S.D. 261, 63 N.W.2d 341 (1954). See also State v. Hull,
65 Wyo. 251, 199 P.2d 832 (1948).
'7
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board of zoning appeals may constitutionally vary the use provisions of the ordinance.2
West Virginia has adopted the former view, Chief Justice
Haden stating, "we must concur with the rationale of the leading
case, Lee v. Board of Adjustment 9 . . .,that 'no variance is lawful
which does precisely what a change of map would accomplish.' ""
A board of zoning appeals, being an administrative agency, acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity, is not a law-making body. As a result,
the board has no power to amend the zoning ordinance under
which it functions." The court noted:
This is particularly true under the West Virginia statute, where,
as previously noted, only the governing body of a municipality
is granted the authority to regulate and determine the use of
land, to classify, regulate and restrict the location of businesses,
32
and to divide the municipality into zoning districts.
In West Virginia, if a landowner wishes to use his land in a
manner not permitted by the zoning ordinance or enumerated as
a special exception thereto, what recourse is available to him, since
he may not have the use restriction modified by variance? 3 One
remedy available is resort to the political system. He may ask the
governing body to amend the zoning ordinance 4 to permit the use
u' Arant v. Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Appeal
of Blackstone, 8 Del. 230, 190 A. 597 (1937); Wood v. Twin Lakes Mobile Home
Village, Inc., 123 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1960); State v. Gunderson, 198 Minn. 51, 268
N.W. 850 (1936); Freeman v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534
(1934); Fortuna v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 95 N.H. 211, 60 A.2d 133 (1948);
Oklahoma City v. Harris, 191 Okla. 125, 126 P.2d 988 (1941); Application of Devereaux Foundation, Inc., 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744 (1945); See other cases collected
in Nelson v. Donaldson, 255 Ala. 76, 50 So. 2d 244 (1951) and 2 RATHKOPF, supra
note 7, at 38-1.
21226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E.2d 128 (1946).
11Wolfe v. Forbes, 217 S.E.2d 899, 906 (W. Va. 1975), citing Lee v. Board of
Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 112, 37 S.E.2d 128, 133 (1946).
3' Wolfe v. Forbes, 217 S.E.2d 899, 906 (W. Va. 1975). See also Lee v. Board of
Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 112, 37 S.E.2d 128, 133 (1946); Welch v. Swasey, 193
Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745, 118 Am. St. Rep. 523 (1907); J. METZENBAUM, LAw OF
ZONINC. 259 (2d ed. 1955).
" Wolfe v. Forbes, 217 S.E.2d 899, 906 (W. Va. 1975), discussing W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-24-39 (1969).
3 This situation is to be distinguished from that in which the landowner would
wish to complain of an error of the board of zoning appeals (such as improper
construction of the ordinance) or errors in the procedure followed by the board (such
as a lack of findings), in which case the proper remedy would be certiorari to the
circuit court under W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24-59 (1969).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24-23 (1969).
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he desires in his area.3 The efficacy of this remedy, of course,
depends solely on the landowner's ability to convince the governing
body that the proposed amendment is consistent with the comprehensive plan of the municipality and is in the best interests of the
general welfare of the inhabitants.3 6 The other remedy available to
the landowner is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. " In
order to utilize mandamus, the landowner should apply to the
building inspector or other such administrative agent for a permit
to use his land in the desired manner. If refused on the ground that
the zoning ordinance forbids such use, he should seek a writ of
1 There is no minimum size as to the area which must be rezoned. Contrary
to popular belief, spot zoning, which is a practice whereby a single lot or area is
granted privileges not granted or extended to other land in the vicinity in the same
use district, is not always invalid. The general rule is that "it is only when there is
an arbitrary or unreasonable devotion of the small area so zoned or rezoned to uses
inconsistent with those to which the rest of the district is restricted, and it is so
rezoned for the sole benefit of the private interest of the owner, that such zoning is
invalid, but if the rezoning is in accordance with the comprehensive plan and serves
the general welfare it is valid." 1 RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 26-3, 26-4.
" There can be no court review of this method since certiorari does not lie to
review actions of a governing body of a municipality in enacting a zoning ordinance,
or an amendment thereto. Garrison v. City of Fairmont, 150 W. Va. 498, 147 S.E.2d
397 (1966).
31The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held on numerous occasions that a writ of mandamus will not issue unless three conditions coexist: (1) a
clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondents to
do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another
adequate remedy at law. E.g., Traverse Corporation v. Latimer, 205 S.E.2d 133,
138 (W. Va. 1974).
That mandamus may be used to raise the issue of the constitutionality of a
zoning ordinance was settled in Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54
S.E.2d 747 (1949). See also State ex rel. Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d
102 (W. Va. 1973); Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243
(1966); G-M Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961);
State ex rel. Ammerman v. City of Philippi, 136 W. Va. 120, 65 S.E.2d 712 (1951);
Sudduth v. Snyder, 120 W. Va. 746, 200 S.E. 55 (1938); Central Nat'l. Bank v. City
of Buckhannon, 118 W. Va. 26, 188 S.E. 661 (1936); State ex rel. Austin v. Thomas,
96 W. Va. 628, 123 S.E. 590 (1924); State ex rel. Johnson v. City of Charleston, 91
W. Va. 318, 112 S.E. 577 (1922); State ex rel. Sale v. Stahlman, 81 W. Va. 335, 94
S.E. 497 (1917); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915).
In West Virginia "the tendency. . . is to enlarge and advance the scope of the
remedy of mandamus, rather than to restrict and limit it, in order to afford the
reliek to which a party is entitled when there is no other adequate and complete
legal remedy." State ex rel. Smoleski v. County Ct. of Hancock County. 153 W. Va.
307, 312, 168 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1969). For a more detailed discussion on the use of
mandamus see Davis, Mandamus To Review Administrative Actions In West
Virginia, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1957).
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mandamus against the municipality or county, the mayor or
county commissioners, and the official who refused the permit,
ordering that a permit be granted."
There are three possible grounds upon which to support a writ
of mandamus; these grounds are all interrelated and indistinct,
and all raise the issue of the constitutionality of an ordinance. The
grounds are: (1) that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it
is not sufficiently related to the police power of the municipality;
(2) that although the ordinance may be valid in its adoption and
may fall within the police power vested in the city council, it is
invalid in its application or affect upon a particular piece of property because of arbitrariness or as being unreasonably discriminatory; and (3) that although the ordinance may be valid in its adoption, may fall within the police power vested in the city council,
and has been uniformly applied in the area, it is nevertheless invalid because it denies the landowner any reasonable use of his
property and is, therefore, a taking of private property without
compensation.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals initially considered the first. of these grounds in the 1915 case, Fruth v. Board of
Affairs." In this decision, the court held that a zoning regulation
based solely on aesthetic grounds was not within the police power
of the state and constituted a taking without compensation. However, a zoning ordinance based on the traditional police powers of
health, safety and general welfare, and to which aesthetic considerations are merely incidental, would be valid. 0 The Fruth decision
is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions in this country, 4' but
there is a modem trend emerging which recognizes that protecting
the aesthetics of an area may also be a valid purpose of zoning
ordinances. 2 Although the Fruthholding has never been overruled,
West Virginia may have adopted the modem trend, since later
3' Of course, under W. VA. R. PRAC. SUP. CT. OF APP. XVIII the action would
have to be brought in the circuit court.
' 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915).
" Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 39-40, 119 S.E.2d 833, 843-844 (1960). See
also I RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 11-1. In Farley, the court said: "To say the very
least, the prior decisions of this Court are authority for the proposition that unsightliness may be considered with other proper factors in upholding a legislative
enactment based on an exercise of the police power." 146 W. Va. at 47, 119 S.E.2d
at 848.
411 RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 11-1. See also Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968).
12

1 RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 11-1. See also Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1968).
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West Virginia cases, although not dealing with zoning, have held
that the police power does extend to aesthetics.43
In State ex rel. Sale v. Stahlman,"1 the court overturned an
ordinance requiring all new buildings in a certain area to be at
least three stories in height. The court, noting that ordinances
limitingthe height of buildings could be justified on grounds of fire
safety, saw no relation between this law and the police power and
held it unconstitutional, stating that a law cannot be imposed to
effect symmetry or ornamentation.
Another case invalidating an ordinance as being outside the
ambit of the police power is State ex rel. Austin v. Thomas, 5 where
the court considered an ordinance which provided that no commercial buildings could be built if within 300 feet of the proposed site
there were more residences than business houses, unless threefourths of the residential owners consented. The court held that:
11Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960); Martin v. Williams,
141 W. Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956); Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881,
54 S.E.2d 747 (1949); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va.
608, 191 S.E. 368 (majority opinion), 192 S.E.2d 291 (1937) (concurring opinion).
In Barrack, a suit to enjoin a nuisance, Judge Maxwell, writing for the court,
stated: "Happily, the day has arrived when persons may entertain appreciation of
the aesthetic and be heard in equity in vindication of their love of the beautiful,
without becoming objects of opprobrium. Basically, this is because a thing visually
offensive may seriously affect the residents of a community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes, and may produce a decided reduction in property values.
Courts must not be indifferent to the truth that within essential limitations aesthetics has a proper place in the community affairs of modem society." 118 W. Va. at
612-13, 191 S.E. at 371.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kenna voiced the belief that considerations of
unsightliness or aesthetics should be left to the legislature in the exercise of the
police power. 118 W. Va. at 614-619, 192 S.E. at 291-294 (concurring opinion). See
Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 45, 119 S.E.2d 833, 846-47 (1960).
In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
"The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive ....

The

values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case,
the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that
take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise
them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in
the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way."
" 81 W. Va. 335, 94 S.E. 497 (1917).
96 W. Va. 628, 123 S.E. 590 (1924).
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A legal exercise of the police power should operate uniformly upon all persons similarly situated who may be affected
thereby. Testing the ordinance by these principles, has it a
valid basis? It does not place an absolute restriction on the use
of property within residential districts for business structures,
but undertakes merely to confer upon three-fourths of the property owners authority to say who shall be granted the privilege.
The ordinance would clothe these individuals with the powers
of government to refuse the right to one and bestow it upon
another; thus denying to the former a legitimate use of his property, not in return for any general benefits resulting to the
neighborhood from a strict maintenance of its residential character (this will not be accomplished), but in order simply that
the latter may be favored."
It is important to note that the three preceding cases were
decided in 1915, 1917, and 1924. Since then, courts have demonstrated a tendency to constantly expand the police power. More
recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has stated:
In brief the police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignity, existing independently of a constitutional grant thereof.
In general terms it may be said that it is as broad and comprehensive as the demands of society for its exercise. It is not static,
but it is capable of evolving within constitutional limits to meet
the demands or needs of an increasingly dense population and
an increasingly complex society. Its scope is not to be determined on the basis of precedent alone, for there may be no
precise precedent for the needs or demands of a given time; but
such needs or demands also may furnish a measure of its
scope."
Furthermore, the court has stated that it is not within its province
or power "to pass judgment on the exercise of the legislative discretion and prerogative in determining the need for or the wisdom of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power."4 Accordingly, the standard of review has been set as follows:
Whether in any given case the general welfare calls for particular legislation is a question primarily for the legislature; and the
courts will not ordinarily interfere therewith, unless, after every
allowance is made, the legislature has been found to have ex"Id. at 633, 123 S.E. at 592.
'T Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 38, 119 S.E.2d 833, 843 (1960).
Id. at 37, 119 S.E.2d at 842.
Id., quoting 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw, § 198, at 968 (1956).
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ceeded its powers or no sufficient basis for such exercise can be
found. 4'
As a result, the police power ground for mandamus in challenging
the validity of a zoning ordinance will be limited in application
and usefulness.
The second ground upon which to seek a writ of mandamus is
that, although the zoning ordinance may be valid in its adoption
and fall within the police power vested in the municipality, it is
arbitrary or unreasonably discriminatory in its application to a
particular piece of property."0 Most cases in which a landowner
wishes to challenge a zoning ordinance will lend themselves more
readily to this ground, and therefore it should prove most useful
to the West Virginia practitioner. In Carter v. City of Bluefield,'
a landowner challenged the zoning of a particular area as residential where his property was virtually surrounded by lots devoted
to industrial and business uses. The court found that the predominate use of the greater part of the area was business and industrial,
and that the area was unsuitable for residential purposes as evidenced by the absence of any newly constructed residences and by
only two or three old residences in the area. Based on these findings, the court held that the ordinance had no relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the city, amounted to
a taking of private property without compensation, and was violative of article 3, section 9 of the West Virginia Constitution "2 and
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
G-M Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling3 involved an ordinance
setting up two commercial zones, Commercial A and Commercial
B, with the only material difference in the two zones being that in
Commercial A gasoline stations were prohibited. A landowner,
desiring to erect a gasoline station in an area zoned Commercial
A, challenged the ordinance on the grounds that the distinction
- State ex rel. Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973);
Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966); G-M Realty,
Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961); Carter v. City of
Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949). See also Zahn v. Board of Pub.
Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Sudduth v. Snyder, 120 W. Va. 746, 200 S.E. 55 (1938);
State ex rel. Johnson v. City of Charleston, 91 W. Va. 318, 112 S.E. 577 (1922).
s,132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
52W. VA. CONsT. art. Ill, § 9 provides: "Public property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use, without just compensation .....
11146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961).
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was invalid. The court rejected this claim, finding that there had
been no other gasoline stations permitted in the area and that
gasoline stations inherently involve potential danger to the public
safety, stating:
There appears no doubt that the effects of such ordinance
do, to some extent, lessen the value and limit the free and
independent use of plaintiff's property. That, however, does not
afford the test of unreasonable discrimination. No doubt rights
and privilges [sic] of some individuals are to some extent limited or controlled by every such zoning ordinance. The spacious
and indefinable breadth of the police power, though not entirely
without constitutional limitations, permits reasonable restrictions of the rights and privileges of the individual for the needed
protection of the health, safety, morals or general welfare of all.
Due process, of course, requires that no unreasonable discrimination exist, but in the instant case no person is allowed to
construct a gasoline service station within the prohibited area,
while the plaintiff, or no other person, is denied the right to
construct a building or to operate a business therein which falls
within the class of businesses permitted by the ordinance. All
are treated alike. 54
In Anderson v. City of Wheeling,55 landowners sought a writ
of mandamus to compel the city to rezone their properties as commercial. The landowners owned property fronting on a street which
intersected a main thoroughfare. The lots fronting on the side
street were zoned as residential while those facing the main thoroughfare were commercial. The plaintiffs' properties were contiguous with the commercial property, being the end properties on the
side street. The court affirmed the circuit court's refusal of a writ
of mandamus on the ground that since there were both positive
and negative factors in the record, the decision of the city authorities in the exercise of their legislative function would not be overruled, since all reasonable presumptions should be indulged in
favor thereof. 6
The most recent case of this genre is State ex rel. Cobun v.
Town of Star City,57 in which a landowner challenged the applica51Id. at 366, 120 S.E.2d at 252-53, citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and 101 C.J.S. Zoning, § 15 (1958).
150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966).
Id. at 701, 149 S.E.2d at 251, citing G-M Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling,
146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961) and Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va.
881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
5 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973).
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tion of a zoning ordinance forbidding her to use her land as a trailer
park, since two adjacent landowners were being permitted to use
their land as trailer parks. The court upheld the ordinance, stating
that the evidence did not show that the area in question was primarily a commercial area. The turning point in this case seemed
to be that only two other landowners were permitted to so use the
property, one of which was permitted under a "grandfather" '
clause, the other under an improper spot zone."9
From these cases several rules are evident. First, when a zoning ordinance is challenged with regard to the validity of the restriction imposed by such ordinance, each case should be determined on the particular facts involved."0 Second, these cases have
announced and followed the "fairly debatable" rule, which rule
has been summarized and explained as follows:
The determination of the necessity for or the nature of a
zoning ordinance is a function of the legislative department of
the government, though the courts cautiously, and with prudent regard for the rights of the individual, must determine
whether an ordinance, or, for that matter, any other legislative
enactment, constitutes a violation of due process, or for any
reason is violative of any constitutional provision, when such a
question is properly presented. That department possesses the
facilities, or may obtain the same, for determining the wisdom
of or necessity for such a law, and its probable effects on the
health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people of the
municipality, including the necessity for shaping a program or
the planning for future improvement or growth of the municipality. .

.

. [C]ourts are not disposed to declare ordinances

invalid, in whole or in part, "where the question whether they
are arbitrary or unreasonable is fairly debatable."6'
If, prior to the adoption of a zoning restriction, property was used for a lawful
purpose which the ordinance would thereafter prohibit, such property is held to
have acquired a vested right to continue such nonconforming use. Most zoning
ordinances contain a section specifically exempting such properties from their operation. Such sections are often referred to as grandfather clauses. 2 RATHKOPF, supra
note 7, at 58-1; State ex rel. Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va.
1973).
'

See note 35, supra.

State ex rel. Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973);
Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966); G-M Realty,
Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961); Carter v. City of
Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
62 G-M Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 367, 120 S.E.2d 249,
253, citing Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949); See
C0
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Third, the courts have indicated several factors which they will
consider in reviewing ordinances under this type of challenge: (1)
What is the use of the property surrounding that under consideration? 2 (2) What is the predominate use of nearby property?"' (3)
Would the use which the challenger desires tend to produce results
not already present in the property located in the nearby area?"
(4) For what purpose is the property best suited?65 and (5) Does the
challenger seek to use his property in the same manner as other
owners in the area?"
The third method of challenging the application of a zoning
ordinance by mandamus is that although the ordinance may be
valid in its adoption, may fall within the police power vested in the
city council, and has been uniformly applied in the area, it is
nevertheless invalid as it applies to or affects a particular piece of
property in that it denies the owner any reasonable use of his
property and is, therefore, a taking of private property without
compensation. 7
In order to utilize this third method, the landowner must show
that the property in question cannot be reasonably used for any of
the purposes permitted by the ordinance. In Carter v. City of
Bluefield,61 the court stated that the effect of the ordinance under
scrutiny was to deprive the landowners of their right to use the
land for any other purpose except for residential purposes." The
court then observed that the property was unsuitable for that puralso Goreib v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S.
325 (1927).
11State ex reL. Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973);
Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966); G-M Realty,
Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961); Carter v. City of
Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
11State ex rel. Cobun v. Town of Star City, 197 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1973);
Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966); G-M Realty,
Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961); Carter v. City of
Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
'" Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966).
95Anderson v. City of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966); Carter
v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
11Anderson v. Cfty of Wheeling, 150 W. Va. 689, 149 S.E.2d 243 (1966); G-M
Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 120 S.E.2d 249 (1961); Carter v.
City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
'" Carter v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949). See also 1
RATHKOPF, supra note 7, at 6-1 et seq. and cases collected therein.
132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
132 W. Va. at 906, 54 S.E.2d at 761.
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pose, as evidenced by the lack of any new residential construction
and the virtual absence of any old residences." Because of these
factors, the court found that the ordinance amounted to a taking
of private property without compensation. 7' This ground of mandamus will be somewhat limited in its application due to the unique
circumstances required for its invocation.
The reliance of the West Virginia court on its lower courts'
ability to oversee the application of zoning ordinances and relieve
unnecessary hardships in the limited situations described above is
superior to the method utilized in other states of giving boards of
zoning appeals the power to grant a "use variance." The application of use restrictions should be sparingly modified and then only
in the above described situations when failure to do so would result
in the partial or total unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The
reasons for this include the fact that the ordinance represents the
legislative body's determination of what is proper and best for the
public welfare both now and in the future, 7 and that property
values of a neighborhood will be depreciated if people feel that the
7 "
use or character of the area may be freely changed by variance.
The standard of unnecessary hardship which would cause the
unconstitutionality of an ordinance is a complex one to apply, and
while theoretically a board of zoning appeals might be able to do
so, in practice they are found wanting. Too often, rather than
basing their decisions on a legal standard, the boards of zoning
appeals often base their decisions on either political or popular
grounds or on the "chamber of commerce" view of what the board
feels is best for the general welfare of the city, a laudable ground
perhaps, but nevertheless one which invades the determinative
province of the governmental body's legislative branch.
The use of mandamus provides a detached, judicial, de novo74
determination of unnecessary hardship under a legal standard
which will be applied equally to each person, based truly on unnecessary hardship. While it may seem that going to court represents
additional trouble and expense for those entitled to a modification
7I /d.

"132 W. Va. at 907-908, 54 S.E.2d at 762.
'z See G-M Realty, Inc. v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 360, 366-67, 120 S.E.2d
249, 253 (1961).
'a

8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§

25.162 (3d ed. 1965).

In the case of appellate review of the board's decision, the correctness of the
board's actions would have to be presumed.
'
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of use, the practitioner must remember that the instances where
there is legal entitlement to a use modification are rare, and in
those cases, a great number end up the subject of a court proceeding anyway, as an appeal from the ruling of a board of zoning
appeals.
John Preston Bailey
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